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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITIZENS BANK, a State 




THE ELKS BUILDING, N. V ., a 





Case No. 18185 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory relief brought by the Plaintiff-
Respondent, The Citizens Bank, as a secured party lender against the Defendant-
Appellant, as Lessor, to determine the priority of the parties to certain personal 
property of a tenant upon premises of the Defendant-Appellant which was 
pledged as security for a loan from the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon a Stipulation of Facts the parties brought cross motions for 
summary judgment. Based upon the Stipulation of Facts and arguments of 
counsel, the lower court granted Plaintiff-Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment and denied Def endant-Applellant's motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower court 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Food Innovations Systems, Inc. is a Utah Corporation doing business 
under the assumed name of Pouches, Inc. As Pouches, Inc., the Corporation 
operated two restaurants in Salt Lake City. One of the restaurants was located 
in the Elks Building, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Pouches, Inc. defaulted in it's lease agreement with the Elks 
Building by failing to make payment for rent due November 15, 1980. (R.23) 
On December 8, 1980, Pouches, Inc. was served with a Notice from the 
Defendant-Appellant that if payment of the delinquent rent was not made by 
January 8, 1981, the Defendant-Appellant would commence legal proceedings 
to recover the delinquent rent. (R.23) 
Pouches, Inc. failed to make the payment on January 8, 1981, as 
demanded, but the Defendant-Appellant did not commence legal proceedings 
as threatened in the Notice until April 9, 1981. At no time during the lease 
2 
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period did the Defendant-Appellant terminate the lease with Pouches, Inc. nor 
did the Defendant-Appellant attempt to rel et the premises to another tenant. 
(R.9) On or about March 18, 1981, Pouches, Inc. made application for an SBA 
loan from The Citizens Bank in the amount of seventy thousand dollars 
($70,000.00). 
The Citizens Bank approved the loan application, and in turn, submitted the 
loan application to the SBA for approval. (R. 9) The SBA approval was received 
March 24, 1981. (R.9) On April 7, the loan was made to Pouches, Inc. and 
proceeds disbursed on April 7, 1981. (R.9) The obligation of Pouches, Inc. was 
evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of $70,000.00 and was secured by 
a security interest in all machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures owned 
·or thereafter acquired and in proceeds thereof owned by Food Inovations 
Systems, dba Pouches, Inc. (R.35) The Plaintiff-Respondent perfected it's 
security interest by filing. a financing statement on April 7, 1981. (R.36) As 
of that date, the Plaintiff-Respondent held a perfected security interest in all 
of the personal property of Pouches_, Inc. located at the Elks Building. (R.35,36) 
Two days after the Plaintiff-Respondent obtained its perfected 
security interest in the equipment at the Elks Building, the Defendant-Appellant 
filed a complaint against Pouches, Inc., under which the Defendant-Appellant 
elected to pursue it's statutory lessor's lien right. (R.10) Service of Process 
was not obtained until some time quring the summer of 1981 and on August 
28, 1981 a judgment by default was obtained upon Defendant-Appellant's 
statutory lessor's lien right. 
Thereafter, because of the small sums involved, the parties agreed 
to have their competing claims determined by summary judgment baseq upon 
a Stipulation of Facts prepared by the parties jointly, and the parties stipulated 
that all documents attached to the Stipulation and Exhibits be admissable to 
3 
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determine the issues raised i~ the pleadings, and further stipulated that the 
court should interpret all exhibits according to their terms, and should enter 
judgment on all issues raised in the pleadings based upon the facts of the case 
as set forth in the Stipulation and Exhibits. (R.6,7) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FOLLOWING 
THE UTAH STATUTE WHICH PROVIDES THAT ALL 
LESSOR'S LIEN RIGHTS ARE SUBORDINATE TO 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS. 
The Defendant-Appellant argues that it's lessor's lien right attached prior 
in time to perfection of the Plaintiff-Respondent's security interest and 
therefore Defendant-Appellant claims that its statutory lessor's lien is prior 
in right to Plaintiff-Respondent's perfected security interest. The trial court 
rejected Defendant-Appellant's argument because the argument is contrary to 
the express priority provisions· set forth in the Utah Code Annotated. 
The priority to be given lessor's liens, as a class, is set forth in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 38-3-2 (1953) (amended 1977). This Section provides: 
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be 
pref erred to all other liens or claims except claims for 
taxes and liens of mechanics under chapter 1 of this 
title, perfected security interests, and claims of 
employees for wages which are· preferred by law; 
provided, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a 
bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, or when his property shall be purt into the 
possession of a receiver, the lien herein provided for 
shall be limited to the rent for ninety (90) days prior 
thereto (emphasis added) 
This section establishes priority on the basis of the type of lien held rather 
than the time when a particular lien is acquired. Issues between competing 
4 
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I~ 
liens as to which lien was acquired first in time woUld only be relevant in 
determining competing claims between liens of the same class. The issue of 
first in time is irrelevant when all liens of one class are subordinated to all 
liens of another class. Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 1006 (1980). 
Ignoring the Utah Statute, the Defendant-Appellant relies on two decisions 
from the Supreme Court of New Mexico interpreting New Mexico law i.e., 
Chessport N ewarks, Inc. v. Solie, 522 P .2d 812 (N .M. 197 4) and National 
Investment Trust v. Thrift National Bank, 543 P.2d 482 (N.M. 1975). The 
Defendant-Appellant failed to acknowledge that New Mexico has no statutory 
provision which covers priorities between the lessor's lien and a perfected 
security interest as does Utah. In the absense of an absolute rule of perfection 
such as that set forth in the Utah Code, the New Mexico court ruled that 
priority was based on the first interest to be perfected. 
In addition, the Defendant-Appellant failed to make the distinction between 
attachment of the landlord's lien and the method and time in which that lien 
must be perfected. The Code provides that a lessor shall have a lien for rent 
due U{>On all non-ex em pt property of the tenant, brought or kept upon the 
leased premises only so long as the tenant shall occupy the premises and for 
30 days thereafter. U .C.A. Section 38-3-1 (1953). This provision provides for 
attachment of the lessor's lien when property of the tenant is brought on the 
premises, but the lien will not be perfected and will be lost if the lessor does 
not take the required actions to perfect the lien within 30 days after the 
tenant leaves the premises. The Code provides that before the lessor may 
take the property of the tenant, the lessor is required to file a complaint and 
only after the filing of a complaint may a writ of attachment issue in aid of 
the lessor's lien. U .C.A. 38-3-3,-4 (1953). Upon the filing of the complaint 
by the lessor, with a supporting affidavit and bond, it is the duty of the court 
5 
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to issue a writ of attachment and to make· a determination of the priorities 
of the claims, liens and security interests in the property of the tenant. U .C.A. 
38-3-5 (1953) (amended 1977); Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States 
Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah. 2d 266, 451 P .2d 778 (1969). 
According to the facts before the Court, the tenant ceased to occupy 
the premise~ on December 8, 1980, and therefore the lessor's lien which had 
attached to the property had to be perfected or would be lost by January 8, 
1981. The undisputed fact is that no complaint was filed by the Defendant-
Appellant until more than four months after the tenant ceased to occupy the 
premises, and never did the lessor seek writ of attachment or determination 
of the priorities of competing claims in the property of the tenant. 
Therefore, in view of the statute and the actions of the Defendant-
Appellant, the lower court was correct in rejecting the argument that the 
lessor's statutory lien was prior in right to the Plaintiff-Respondent's perfected 
security interest. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
RULING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY 
LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT CREATE A 
SECURITY INTEREST IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledges that the lease default provision 
expressly authorized the landlord to re-enter the premises, preserve his statutory 
lien right by taking possession of the personal property on the premises and 
reletting the premises for the account of the tenant. 
However the Plaintiff-Respondent and the lower court rejected the 
Defendant-Appellant's claim that the default provisions of the real property 
lease agreement should also be construed as a security agreement which granted 
6 
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the Defendant-Appellant a security interest in the personal property of Pouches, 
Inc. 
The Defendant-Appellant seeks to base its claim on the Default and 
Remedies section of the lease, Paragraph 25, which provides in part: 
In the event of any such material default or breach 
by Tenant, Landlord may at any time thereafter, with 
or without notice or demand, without limiting L:andlord 
in the exercise of any other right or remedy which 
Landlord may have by reason of such default or breach: 
a. without terminating this lease, may r~enter 
the premises, with or without process of law, and take 
possession of the same and of all equipment and fixtures 
therein, and thereafter relet the premises or any part 
thereof for the account of Tenant for such terms and 
upon such conditions as Landlord may deem proper; •••• 
(R.20) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent does not contend that a landlord and tenant could 
not agree to have a real property lease also contain provisions of a security 
agreement, creating a security interest in personal property of the tenant. ~ 
e.g., Foster v. Hamblin 405 F .2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1969) (A security interest was 
intended by the parties where the agreement provided, "All of lessee's mining 
machinery and equipment upon said premises shall be subject to a lien to 
secure unto lessors payment of all rental ••• " and the landlord filed a financing 
statement in support of the security interest.); In re King Furniture City, Inc., 
240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (A security interest was intended by the 
parties to an agreement providing, "to secure payment of all rent due ••• tenant 
gives a landlord an express contract lien ..• " and the landlord filed a financing 
statement in support of its security interest). In this case there is no express 
language creating a security interest in favor of the landlord at the time the 
lease agreement was executed and the conduct of the parties illustrates that 
the landlord did not assume it had a security interest until after learning of 
the secured party status of the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Rejection of the Def endant-AppeUfnt's claim is justified by a review the 
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historical development of the tenant account default remedy relied upon by 
the Defendant-Appellant, the express language of the default remedy and the 
conduct of the Defendant-Appellant. 
The tenant account default remedy was developed in response to a 
particular problem encountered by lessors in acting upon to the default of 
tenants. Historically, when a tenant defaulted under a lease agreement a 
lessor was exposed to the potential danger· that his re-entry into or reletting 
of the premises, prior to the expiration of the term of the lease, could be 
construed as an acceptance of a surrender of the premises by the tenant. The 
legal effect of such surrender was to effect the termination of the lease· and 
release the tenant from further obligations to pay rent. See generally, G. 
Thompson, Real Property 3A, Section 1342-48 (1959). In response to this 
problem lessors began inserting a provision which would permit them, without 
terminating the lease, to re-enter the premises and take control of the premises 
and property, and to rel et the premises for the account of the tenant until 
the landlord had been made whole from the default of the tenant. See 
generally, C. Berger, Land Ownership and Use, 2ed. 433-40 (1975). The default 
provision in this lease is simply a statement of the· tenant· account theory 
which protects the lessor from the claim that he has accepted a surrender of 
the premises and forfeited his lessor's lien right. 
The language of the lease agreement also indicates that the parties to 
the agreement did not intend to create a security interest in favor of the 
landlord. First, under the lease, the interest of the lessor in the personal 
property of the tenant arose only after the default of the tenant and existed 
only so long as the property remained on the premises, which is exactly the 
interest recognized by the statutory lessor's lien. However, if a security 
interest were to attach to the personal property of the tenant, that interest 
8 
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woUld follow- the property whether the property were located on the leased 
premises or located elsewhere. The lease provision only repeats the interest 
recognized by the statutory lessor's lien but does not expand the lessor's 
interest to that of a secured party under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Second, the right of the lessor to take possession of the property is 
coupled with the landlord's obligation to relet the premises for the account 
of the tenant. Nowhere in the lease provision is the right granted the landlord 
to make a public or private sale without legal process, as he could do, if he 
were a secured party creditor. Finally, there is no representation that the 
personal property of the tenant was free of encumbrances nor is there a 
covenant that the property will remain unencumbered during the term of the 
lease. Both of these issues are fundamental concerns of parties to security 
agreements. 
The strongest evidence that the claimed security interest was an after-
the-fact creation of the Defandant-Appellant is the conduct of the Defendant-
Appellailt. First, upon the default of Pouches, Inc., the Defendant-Appellant 
did not avail itself of the remedy to re-enter the premises, take possession 
of the per~onal _property and relet the premises for the account of the tenant. 
As the Defendant-Appellant admitted, at no time during the lease period did 
it terminate the lease or attempt to relet the premises to another tenant. 
The Defendant-Appellant did pursue its only avenue to acquire the property 
of the tenant which was the action on the statutory lessor's lien. 
Second, if landlord had a security interest in the personal property of the 
tenant, the landlord would have taken immediate steps to perfect its security 
interest by filing a financing statement rather than wait to perfect after the 
tenant was in default. In this case the landlord did nothing which could be 
claimed as perfection of its alleged security interest until after default by 
9 
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the tenant. 
Third, if the lease agreement were also a security agreement creating a 
security interest in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, ~pon the default of 
Pouches, Inc. Defendant-Appellant would have had the right under Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code to make a public or private sale of the 
personal property without judicial proceedings. No such attempt was ever 
made by the Defendant-Appellant because the Def endant-Appell~nt knew it 
had no secured party status. After the default of p_ouches, Inc., the Defendant-
Appellant elected to file a complaint against the tenant on the theory of a 
statutory lessor's lien only. At no time prior to learning of the secured party 
status of the Plaintiff-Respondent was there a claim that the lease agreement 
operated as a security agreement creating a security interest in favor of the 
Defendant-Appellent. The only consistent explanation of the Defendant-
A.ppellant's conduct is that the lease parties did not intend the lease agreement 
to create a security interest in favor of the landlord, and the lease was not 
drafted to provide a security interest in favor of the landlord. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF ALL FACTS OF THE CASE ARE 
VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IB BOUND BY 
ITS ELECTION TO PURSUE THE 
STATUTORY LIEN. 
As noted previously, after Pouches, Inc. defaulted under the lease 
agreement, the Defendant-Appellant elected to pursue judgment against 
Pouches, Inc. on the basis of the statutory lessor's lien. (R.98,46-47) such 
action on the part of the Defendant-Appellant constituted an election of its 
10 
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remedy against Pouches, Inc. for default under the lease agreement. 25 . .\m. 
Jur. 2d, Election Of Remedies, Sections 7 and 19; Royal Resourses, Inc. v. 
Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979); Cook v. Covey-
Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927). 
Election of Remedies is an equitable doctrine established to do justice 
between the parties. Royal Resourses, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., supra. 
The defense of election of remedies must be raised by way of answer, motion 
or demand so as to put the issue before the trial court. id. at 796. The issue 
of the election of remedies was raised by the trial court during oral argument 
on the cross motions for summary judgment. (R.98) In relevant part the record 
states: 
(Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Ms. Curry): "So whether or 
not this court finds that the (Defendant-Appellant) had a statutory 
lien or a contractual lien, we believe we have shown that the statutory 
lien attached upon the property getting onto the premises that was 
the latest point in time, and it is not subject to Article 9 because 
there was no perfected security interest at the time. If the court 
finds we have a contractual lien, then we do come within the ambit 
and we perfected our security interest by taking possession some three 
months before the (Plaintiff-Respondent) did." 
Now, the (Plaintiff-Respondent) has argued-
THE COURT: Now, you read to me you could take possession of 
it. Then what does the lease provide? 
MS. CURRY: Well, it says that the landlord may pursue 
any and all remedies it has at law. 
THE COURT: Tell me what remedy you pursue. 
MS. CURRY: We pursue the· statutory lien eventually. 
THE COURT: All right. 
The Defendant-Appellant is bound by the election made in the proceedings 
against Pouches, Inc. under the holding in Brigham City Sand and Gravel v. 
Machinery Center, Inc, 613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980). In that case the Plaintiff 
stored equipment with the first Defendant. The first Defendant in turn sold 
11 
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the equipment to the second Defendant. The Plaintiff brought an action agains 
both Defendants for money damages or return of the property. Prior to tria 
the Plaintiff and the first Defendant entered into a settlement, but the Plaintif: 
expressly reserved all rights against the second Defendant. In affirming thE 
ruling of the trial court, this Court noted that it was the f allure of thE 
Plaintiff to use reasonable diligence to protect its interest in the propert~ 
that provided the foundation for the events which resulted in the seconc 
Defendant's intervening interest. Since the second Defendant derived it~ 
interest in the property from the first Defendant this Court held that thE 
second Defendant could claim the benefit of the election made by the Plaintiff 
with the first Defendant. id. at 512. 
The controlling facts of Brigham City Sand and Gravel v. Machiner~ 
Center, Inc., supra, are present in this case. Here the Defendant-Appellant 
failed to use reasonable diligence to pursue its remedy against Pouches, Inc., 
and during that delay Plaintiff-Respondent acquired its security interest in the 
property. Also, the Plaintiff-Respondent acquired its interest in the property 
from Pouches, Inc., the party against whom the Defendant-Appellant made a 
binding election. Therefore, the Plaintiff-Respondent is entitled to the benefit 
of the election made, and the Defendant-Appellant is precluded from asserting 
a claim for a new remedy in the present case. 
12 
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POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HOLDS A 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY OF POUCHES, INC. 
The Defendant-Appellant raises an issue as to whether or not the Plaintiff-
Respondent has a purchase money security interest or just a perfected security 
interest in the property of Pouches, Inc. Pouches, Inc. represented to Plaintiff-
Respondent that the security interest granted in the property would be a 
purchase money security interest. (R.35) The parties in this action did not 
stipulate to the conclusiveness of the representation of Pouches, Inc. and 
therefore Plaintiff-Respondent only claimed to have a perfected security 
interest in the property of Pouches, Inc. (R.90-91) On appeal, Plaintiff-
Respondent again makes no greater claim than being a secured party lender 
and not a purchase money lender. In light of the points discussed previously 
in this brief there is no need. for the Court to make a determination as to 
whether the Plaintiff-Respondent was a purchase money lender. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in finding the perfected security interest of 
the Plaintiff-Respondent prior to the Defendant-Appellant's statutory lessor's 
lien because the priority was established by the lessor's lien statute. 
The trial court did not err in rejecting Defendant-Appellant's efforts to 
construct, after-the-fact, a security interest in the personal property of 
Pouches, Inc. because the Defendant-Appellant's claim was not supported by 
the language of the lease agreement or the conduct of the Defendant-Appellant. 
Even if the Defendant-Appellant were allowed to claim a security interest 
13 
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in the property of Pouches, Inc. its claim to priority is barred by its electic 
to obtain judgment against Pouches, Inc. on the statutory lessor's lien. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 1982. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby declare that I hand-delivered two true and correct copies of th 
foregoing Respondent's brief to Joseph C. Rust, attorney for Appellant, thi 
18th day of March, 1982, at 2000 Beneficial. Life Tower, 36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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